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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between foreign aid (ODA), foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and their effect on domestic investment in five landlocked and emerging economies of 
Central Asia. It is important for donor countries to understand whether their aid helps to bring in 
a private capital essential in transition period or not. If it does, it creates a ground for public-
private partnership that could release from financial constraints and restore conditions for 
economic growth in transition economies. If it does not, then it calls for reassessing mechanisms 
of ‘aid architecture’. We test ODA-FDI link on two levels: regional and country. Our results from 
seemingly unrelated regression on regional level indicate that (a) aid has a positive role on FDI 
inflows; (b) aid and FDI are complementing flows, and (c) FDI complements domestic 
investment, while ODA decrease it. However, on the country level only in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, foreign aid catalyzes FDI inflows. We conclude that the ODA-FDI nexus is present in 
countries with low per capita GDP and economic growth. There is a need for improvement of aid 
mechanism and a room for public-private cooperation in economies of Central Asia. 
 
Keywords: Central Asia; transition economies; foreign direct investment; official development 
assistance; gross fixed capital formation 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do external financial flows help developing countries to grow? This is one of the most important 
questions in economic growth and development literature, especially as financial resources in 
developed economies are becoming more limited. Every year, OECD
1
 donors give enormous 
                                                          
1
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has a development assistance 
committee (DAC) that base their decision on disbursing financial aid. It has four categories: 1.Least  
Developed Countries; 2. Other Low Income Countries (per capita GNI<$935 in 2007): Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; 3. Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories (per capita GNI $936-$3.705): 
2 
 
amount of financial resource to five landlocked post-communist and complex Central Asian 
economies (CA5)
2
 in terms of official development assistance (ODA), which is broadly 
humanitarian assistance from developed countries.
3
 ODA is administered by OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) that consists of 24 developed countries.
4
 On the other side, 
multinationals from DAC donor countries launch their projects via foreign direct investment 
(FDI) searching for more profit. Both of these transfers are crucial to transition economies. FDI 
helps recipient countries to encourage specialisation in trade and raise income of low-skilled that 
would eventually lift their wages and decrease inequality. ODA aims to improve social welfare, 
decrease inequality and raise skilled workers pool through technical assistance. At least on a 
conceptual level, both flows extend common features to recipient countries.  
 
In a historically important International Conference for Development (2002) document, “The 
Monterey Consensus”5, and follow-up Doha Declaration on Financing for Development outcome 
report, FDI is viewed as an addition to ODA.
6
 UNCTAD also stresses this point in advising local 
governments: “Channelling some ODA into investment projects financed jointly with domestic 
financial institutions…” 7 . It is important for donor countries to understand whether their 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Turkmenistan; (per capita GNI $3.706-11.455): Kazakhstan. DAC reviews every 3 years GNI per capita 
reported by World Bank and make a list of potential recipients. (OECD website: www.oecd.com) 
 
2  Central Asian economies comprise of: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. Among them: Oil and Gas Exporters: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and Oil and 
Gas Importers: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Source: IMF.  
 
3 On principles, mechanism and opinions on effects of ODA see Hansen and Tarp (2000); Dalgaard et al. 
(2004); Lahiri (2006); Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007); Easterly (2007); Mavrotas and Nunnenkamp 
(2007) and Selaya and Sunesen (2008).  We interchangeably call ODA as foreign aid in this paper. 
 
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States and the European Commission (EC). The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) participate as permanent 
observers. (OECD, Inside the DAC, A Guide to the OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2009-
2010). 
 
5 The United Nations-sponsored summit-level meeting was held in Monterrey, Mexico, from 18 to 22 
March 2002.   
 
6 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: outcome document of the Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. 
(http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_FFD.pdf; United Nations, 2009). 
 
7 “Trade and Development Report 2008’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD): http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4580&lang=1 (Accessed 15 
December 2011). 
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investments induce foreign direct investment. There are few bases behind this notion: (a) foreign 
aid is centred at improving local economic development and sustainability, (b) aid is aimed to 
facilitate more market access opportunities for emerging markets and (c) aid is supposed to 
increase social capital of population, among others. At first it seems they are two different flows 
and no link exists, because FDI is a capital account item and ODA is a transfer payment item of 
current account though both are the balance of payments (BoP) entries. For example, one of the 
ways the link arises when donors who give assistance are also ones who conduct FDI, called 
‘vanguard effect’ according to Kimura and Todo (2010). Why ODA should be important for 
attracting FDI? Private capital is crucial to transition economies at initial phases but need to be 
attracted. Private investors are more selective and attentive since the cost of investment in 
developing countries is high, created by insecure governments, weak legal system and 
underdeveloped infrastructure. If there is no improvement of business environment in recipient 
county from inside, then one viable option is the foreign aid to tackle this issue from outside. In 
this sense the role of foreign aid in adjusting financial constraints to attract a FDI is imperative. 
This creates the need for international organizations such as World Bank to intervene and assist 
countries in developing “new market thinking” to deal with donors and foreign private investors. 
This usually implemented via various foreign aid projects and programs. If there is in fact an 
ODA-FDI connection then it could, given a certain sufficient conditions, (a) facilitate 
improvement of domestic business environment (b) help in designing of domestic modern market 
mechanisms to better secure foreign investment (b) create grounds for public-private partnership, 
such as tiding aid with domestic private sector investments. This “cooperation” would be a 
contribution to long-term economic development and help recipient economies to position 
themselves in international arena. If there is no connection, then it calls attention to reassessing 
the mechanisms of ‘aid architecture’ for long-term civil society building goals. For multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from developed nations it is equally important to gain positive public opinion 
and further explore new markets for profit seeking motives. For recipient local societies and their 
governments, it is crucial to devise policies to favour a particular foreign capital that could bring 
tangible contribution to domestic welfare improvements. 
 
Hence, the central focus of this paper is (1) to explore the possible link between aggregate 
ODA and FDI in five landlocked Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with similar socio-economic situations and financial systems. 
Harms and Lutz (2006) studied 76 developing countries before 2000, excluding CA (5) 
economies, and found strictly positive effect of ODA on FDI especially in countries with 
unfavourable institutional environment. We specifically test their latter conclusion to see whether 
this also holds for Central Asia economies. And (2) to analyze the effect of these foreign flows on 
domestic investment. We test whether foreign flows finance domestic spending on infrastructure.  
 
The link between ODA-FDI was studied only by few scholars and there is no specific 
consensus yet. For example, Kosak and Tobin (2006) state in their panel study of 90 various 
growths level group of countries from 1970 to 2001 that FDI and ODA are unrelated, as each had 
specific effects on economic growth. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) study groups of developed and 
developing countries also emphasise that foreign investment and foreign aid are more like 
substitutes than complements.  None of mentioned studies above includes Central Asian 
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economies. According to the theory of FDI, private investments are favoured more when certain 
business conditions in host countries are met, such as macroeconomic stability, infrastructure, 
regulation and financial system intact (Navaretti and Venables 2004, Globerman and Shapiro 
2002, Davies 2011). Foreign aid is essentially targeted at improving these conditions.  
 
To quantify the above concerns we build a panel data set and estimate our data by 
simultaneous equations modelling called seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) proposed by 
Zellner (1962) to account for simultaneity and cross-section error correlation. Differently from 
previous studies we estimate our model on pooled and individual country levels. The advantage 
of SUR is that it helps us better explore the ODA-FDI link regarding particular country 
simultaneously running three equations.  
 
Our result on regional (pooled) regression level supports Harms and Lutz (2006) conclusions 
and we found positive influence of ODA on FDI inflows in CA (5). The same complementary 
effect of ODA is also corroborated in studies by Hien (2008), Selaya and Sunasen (2008), Asiedy 
et al., (2009) and Bhavan (2011). Moreover, we also found reverse positive effect, that FDI also 
attracts foreign aid (ODA). However, the relation of these flows to domestic investment is 
different: FDI complements, but aid substitutes domestic expenditures. In other words, FDI 
augments, but ODA finance domestic spending on regional CA (5) level. 
 
 On country (individual) regressions we see an interesting and compelling picture. There is no 
unilateral effect anymore, but fragmented one. Only two countries out of five namely, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan display consistent positive correlation of ODA to FDI and vice versa. We attach 
this finding to particular socio-political characteristics of these nations that is depicted with low 
GDP per capita and economic growth. Given that we don’t observe this relation in Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that seems to have broadly defined similar governance, market 
access and political conditions we arrive at a puzzle. Definitely, in these three nations incomes 
are higher and they are energy-exporters, but as appears in this study have no association between 
aid and FDI.  So the only way we can address our observation is by stating the important role of 
national output: GDP per capita level: as low as 461$ (Kyrgyzstan) and 295$(Tajikistan) 
compared with 2.869$ (Kazakhstan), 1.364$(Turkmenistan) and 633$(Uzbekistan) on average for 
the period. We attach this result to this point, e.g. aid has a positive effect in stimulating FDI only 
at very low income levels. After that turning point the effect of aid regarding FDI gradually 
vanishes and natural economic mechanisms come into force.   
 
We derive the following general policy recommendations: (a) in order for CA (5) economies 
to better accommodate FDI they better off re-consider their procedures toward foreign aid, i.e. 
identify the potential sectors and industries where ODA-FDI link is present, (b) ease the capital 
markets regulation, (c) enforce legal system and (d) encourage technological progress through 
trade in machinery and equipment, and finally, (d) direct aid on human capital to raise the 
“absorptive capacity” of nations. These supply-side management practices are supposed to 
contribute to the long-term economic growth. In the short-term, managing money supply, taxation 
and increasing government spending could boost the aggregate demand and hence increase 
national output, GDP.  
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We contribute to the empirical literature on ODA-FDI link by bringing new insights about 
foreign aid effects in transition Central Asian economies that could be helpful for international 
donor organisations, so that they could better devise their programs and do ‘aid architecture’, 
possibly enable better predictions of future aid packages. It could also provide thoughts on re-
assessing public-private collaboration. Our understanding is that, the present paper is the first 
paper that studies foreign transfer flows’ link in five remote economies in Central Asia. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 covers related past literature. Section 3 
discusses ODA-FDI trends in Central Asian region. Section 4 covers our empirical investigation 
and data used. Section 5 contains a discussion on our results. Section 6 summarise the principal 
results and highlights future research prospects.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
There are various ways foreign aid could affect foreign direct investment in host countries. 
According to Harms and Lutz (2006), if foreign aid is directed to infrastructure projects, human 
capital and complementary inputs then it could have an “infrastructure effect”. Enhanced 
domestic conditions could lure foreign investors. Inflows of foreign aid are also expected to raise 
marginal product of capital (MPC) of domestic firms in recipient countries, which in turn attracts 
FDI. Another effect, ‘rent-seeking’ might also appear, possibly arriving from the fact that local 
firms compete for rents from foreign aid. This situation reduces MPC that would result in less 
innovation activities, R&D spending and reduction in efficiency (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Harms and 
Lutz, 2006). The outcome of this behaviour would be more reliance on aid, which would 
discourage FDI. Clearly, foreign aid could add to ‘financing effect’ that directly augments the 
balance of payment (BoP) of the recipient country.  Arellano et al. (2009) argues that aid could 
increase the supply of tradable goods and reduce the price of non-tradable goods. They call it 
’Dutch-disease effect’ that discourages the FDI. Kimura and Todo (2010) claim that there is also 
‘vanguard effect’ of foreign aid, meaning countries who give aid also tend to place an FDI in 
specific host economies. Mody et al. (2003) state that there is an ‘information effect’ that foreign 
aid is carrying into host countries. Private information which is not accessible to the foreigner is 
revealed to investor via foreign aid. Aid programs help investors to collect data and build a study 
on recipient countries.  
 
In general, channels of foreign capital entering the CA (5) region could be outlined as 
follows: foreign aid is directed into social infrastructure targeting complementary inputs, namely, 
health, education, water related projects and economic infrastructure, including energy, 
communication, and transportation.  FDI is primarily focused on physical capital projects, 
production, manufacturing, banking and natural resource extracting sectors. Numerous research 
papers were devoted to analyses of FDI, but very few studies addressed the Central Asian (CA) 
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region that is located in the middle of the East and West continents trade route
8.
 Among them, 
several studies focused on FDI effects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan (e.g. Garibaldi et al. 2001; Shiells 2003; Bayulgen 2005; Penev 2007; Kenisarin and 
Andrews-Speed 2008), but they were under the framework of Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)
9
 or Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
10
 that included countries with different 
economic setup
11
. Studies that focused solely on these five countries are scarce and addressed 
primarily the structural changes and political structure (such as in Gleason, 2001; Dowling and 
Wignaraja, 2006). Some other studies presented a narrative of economic policy developments in 
the region. For example, Dikkaya and Keles (2006) addressed the FDI developments in 
Kyrgyzstan through a case study approach. Other scholars, for instance Venables (2009) showed 
benefits of regional integration in Central Asia via general equilibrium modelling. Pomfret (2005, 
2010) addressed Central Asian regional trade relations and policies, energy institutions, 
regionalism and integration into the world economy. Hoen (2010) expressed his opinion on 
transitional path of Central Asian countries. Kalyuzhnova (2003, 2008) thoughtfully reflects on 
social and economic developments, and energy related issues. 
 
Moreover, the direct link between ODA and FDI was studied only in a handful of papers to 
the best of our knowledge. For example, Karakaplan et al. (2005), Harms and Lutz (2006), 
Kosack and Tobin (2006), and Selaya and Sunesen (2008) studied broad groups of developing 
countries. Kimura and Todo (2010) and Blaise (2005) focus on Japanese FDI and aid flow 
interactions. Carro and Larrú (2010) looked at ODA-FDI link in Argentina and Brazil. Kapfer et 
al. (2007) explored infrastructure aid-FDI links for 59 countries. Asiedu and Nandwa (2009) 
showed that aid mitigates appropriation risk on FDI for 35 low-income and 28 Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Hien (2008) looked at ODA-FDI in 28 provinces of Vietnam. Bhavan et al. (2011) 
analysed nexus between FDI and ODA for South Asian economies. Beladi and Oladi (2006) put 
the ODA-FDI link into a three-goods general equilibrium model and found that when foreign aid 
                                                          
8 For example, the effect of foreign direct investment agglomeration effect for USA see Bobonis and 
Shatz, (2007), how economic freedom in the presence of FDI affects economies in Latin America consult 
Bengoa and Sanches-Robles (2003), and  relation of market size to FDI in several Asian economies see 
Jaumotte (2004) among other comprehensive studies.  
 
9
 CIS is the abbreviation for Commonwealth of Independent States that created in December 08, 1991. It consists of 
twelve countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Georgia (that left CIS on August 14, 2008). The three Baltic States (also 
former Soviet Republics): Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did not join the CIS. 
10 CEE or CEES-stands for Central and Eastern Europe former communist countries: Baltic States-Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania; states of 
former Yugoslavia- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia.  
 
11 For more on mechanism of FDI in post-communist economies the reader is advised to consult Lansbury 
et al. 1996; Bengoa and Sanches-Robles 2003; Campos and Kinoshita 2003; Johnson 2006; Kenisarin 
2008) among others.    
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is directed to public good, it could crowd out foreign investment in the recipient country, when 
given a factor intensity condition.  
 
The findings on ODA-FDI link are mixed. Karakaplan et al. (2005) found that aid has a 
negative effect on FDI. On the other hand, Kosack and Tobin (2006) state that FDI and ODA are 
unrelated due to aid goes to support human capital, and FDI is private and thus goes to physical 
capital. Carro and Larrú (2010) also could not find any systematic relationship between FDI and 
ODA flows.  Caselli and Feyrer (2007) studied marginal product of capital (MPC) and report that 
MPC is roughly the same across developing countries, and inflow of foreign aid only reduces 
MPC. In their study, foreign aid is more substituted to FDI. Further, in the study of 81 developing 
countries (excluding Central Asia from 1988-1999) by Harms and Lutz (2006) authors suggest 
that that after controlling for regulation in host countries, catalysing effect of aid is stronger in 
countries with unfavourable institutional environment. In South Asian countries, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Shi-Lanka and India foreign aid drives in the FDI according to the study by Bhavan et 
al. (2011).   
 
3. Foreign Transfers’ Trends in Central Asia 
 
From 1991, all five countries declared their independence and started building their economies. 
Kazakhstan is the largest and by territory is the half the size of Europe
12
.
 
Central Asia is under 
energy related political game between USA, Russia and China, according to Financial Times 
“Investing in Central Asia 2008” Special Report (FT.com, 2010). The importance of studying 
capital flows into these countries is justified by its strategic geographical location, which gives 
European Union economies, USA, Japan and China trading route to Afghanistan and further to 
the Middle East. Prospective growth and stability in the region could stimulate international trade, 
capital movements and intra Central Asian collaboration that could favour foreign investors. The 
region is rich in natural resources, especially in oil and natural gas, minerals and metals – they are 
of primary interest to multinational enterprises as input factors. For European Union, Central Asia 
is the potential source of future energy supply, especially natural gas.   
 
The importance of attracting FDI inflows to CA (5) is that local firms are restricted and have 
constrains to funding opportunities. Availability of finance to support their businesses via FDI 
inflows (stock, portfolio and loans) is an alternative opportunity to revive the landlocked region’s 
economic development.
13
 Liquidity constraints prevent local firms from creating competitive 
                                                          
12 According to reports from World Bank and International Monetary Fund Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
economies classified as Energy Exporters are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Russia and Energy Importers are Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Moldavia, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine. 
 
13 More detailed analysis on FDI effects on recipient countries consult Navaretti and Venables (2004); 
Mody (2004), Krkoska (2001); Kirkpatrick (2006); Tondel (2001); Carstensen (2004); Mileva (2008), 
Dobrinsky (2007) and recently Hanousek et al., (2011).   
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advantages through rigidities export markets. The region demonstrated high potential for market 
growth and trade relations. Industrial structure of Central Asian region characterised by 
oligopolistic markets in the main industrial sectors affiliated to mineral resources/energy, and 
with monopolistic domestic competition with numerous small-to-medium entrepreneurs. At the 
same time countries have their particular outlook for economic reforms and international policy 
and local developments.  The major type of FDI in Central Asia is Greenfield investment.
14
 This 
is when MNEs create their foreign operation units overseas and integrate vertically thus reducing 
the transfer costs and financial risks. Also, FDI inflows are mostly export-oriented and not 
directed to serve local markets according to Asian Development Bank report (ADB, 2009). 
Foreign capital lands in oil and energy sector, while service sector is almost untouched. The 
major types of foreign investment only happen after reaching agreement with top government 
officials. This may be due to fact that still after 1991, economies could not efficiently build sound 
regulations, functioning financial services and advances in structural reforms. Major investors are 
firms from USA, Japan, China, and developing Asia. Given these conditions and weak domestic 
competition offers a competitive advantage to multinational firms. MNEs that possess superior 
knowledge and technology simply enjoy the amateur markets of CA (5). In practice, MNEs enter 
the markets with political stability in the region as the only concern. This potential concern may 
bring to suppressing of domestic competition; however the benefits of FDI are well-known from 
the experience of Asian Tigers and at least in the beginning phase of the transition.  
 
Table 1. Inward FDI, ODA, Domestic Investment and GDP for the period 1992-2009.  
Country ↓ FDI ODA GFCF GDP 
 Average 
FDI 
Flows 
($) 
Annual 
Average  
Growth  
(%) 
Average 
ODA  
Flows 
($) 
Annual 
Average  
Growth 
 (%) 
Average 
DOM 
Flows 
($) 
Annual 
Average  
Growth 
 (%) 
Average 
GDP 
($) 
Annual 
Average 
Growth 
 (%) 
KAZ 245.73 98.57 11.32 29.84 747.61 12.34 2.869.23 10.60 
KYR 17.83 79.92 46.92 29.30 90.96 11.73 461.39 4.81 
TAJ 13.96 95.53 25.41 29.59 48.68 18.45 294.66 6.67 
TKM 105.34 36.92 6.49 25.01 216.86 7.57 1.364.01 10.72 
UZB 7.71 17.84 5.79 13.47 159.04 4.07 633.32 5.12 
Note: KAZ-Kazakhstan, KYR-Kyrgyzstan, TAJ-Tajikistan, TKM-Turkmenistan and UZB-Uzbekistan. All data for 
FDI –inward foreign direct investment, ODA- total official development assistance net, GFCF-gross fixed capital 
formation and GDP-gross domestic product are measured in per capita current US Dollars in thousands. The nominal 
(or current) series were transformed into per capita values by the following formula:                         
           .For example GDP for Kazakhstan should be read: 2.869.23 $– means two thousand eight hundred 
sixty nine and ninety three US dollars and ODA for UZB as: 5.79$-five dollars and seventy nine cents per 
head. Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (online database, 2011, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx) .   
                                                          
14 FDI is classified as “Greenfield investment” when the MNEs invest by building new factories, plants, 
offices, entities and buildings in host country. These new economic units have their own accounting 
books.  
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Table 1 presents that, on average for 1992-2009, Central Asian economies are different in terms 
of attracting FDI per capita. The huge foreign capital inflows are documented for the region: 188 
million (or 8.14$ per head) in 1992 which soured up to 18.6 billion (or 1.710.42$ per capita) in 
2009. We observe a sharp upward rise of total FDI from 2005 on. This could be due to influence 
from Asia, Chinese investors (Asia Economic Institute, 2012).
15
 The first two countries in the 
ranking of the most attractive destinations for foreign capital inflows are leading energy-exporters 
of the region, Kazakhstan (245.73$ per head) and Turkmenistan (105.34$ per head) which could 
be explained due to investments in oil and gas industries. On the third place is Kyrgyzstan 
(17.83$ per head) that has rich metal deposits. All nations FDI’s annual average growth was 
positive, with exceptional performance of Kazakhstan (99%), Kyrgyzstan (80%) and Tajikistan 
(96%).  
Moreover, the average growth of real ODA per capita was positive and roughly 
homogeneous (29-30%) for all economies, except Uzbekistan (13%). The total foreign aid 
increased approximately more than tenfold from $117 million to $1.251 billion (or in capita terms 
from 13 to 154 $) between the sample period. Kyrgyzstan (47$/capita) and Tajikistan (25$/capita) 
are favourite destinations of donors. Even though the latter two counties are considered as 
energy-importers, Kyrgyzstan has huge mineral resources of non-ferrous metals (mercury ores 
and antimony), substantial coal reserves and gold, while Tajikistan is another region attracting 
much of the foreign aid and very rich in mineral deposits such as metallic ores (zinc, iron, 
mercury, gold, tin and lead) and common salts (such as carbonates, fluorites).  
 
Domestic investment (GFCF) per capita had risen threefold from 12 billion to 41 billion 
dollars on average terms. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s per capita real gross fixed 
investments surged. Overall, average annual growth was around 11%.  The lowest per capita 
GDP nations are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 461 and 294 $. We observe the pattern of more 
increase in FDI growth compared to ODA that raise a question on demand for foreign aid. It 
seems like economies are prospering by the help of FDI, does this mean that FDI is substituting 
ODA? Does foreign aid serve financing the domestic investment in the region because we 
observe the superior growth over domestic spending growth on average? We address these issues 
later in the paper.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 The presence of China in Central Asia was from the beginning of transition in 1991. Investors placed huge money 
in infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  The main goal was to satisfy the big demand for input factors 
and raw material that Central Asia possesses. Source: article “China is investing in Central Asia” 
http://www.asiaecon.org/special_articles/read_sp/12835.  
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4. Econometric methodology 
 
4.1 Empirical  Model 
 
We build a model with three equations to estimate simultaneously: one for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), one for foreign aid (ODA) and one for domestic investment (DOM). The 
reason is that each foreign flow has its own mechanism. FDI is administered through a private 
channel and aid is through a public one. Both of these flows are part of balance of payments. 
Hence, we would assume some reverse association between them. Additionally, we would like to 
test external flows’ effect on investments by local economies (DOM). This carries a crucial point: 
if the foreign flows reduce domestic investment, e.g. financing it, this means that economies of 
CA (5) are less concerned with long-term growth prospects. If they complement domestic flows 
then we consider it as a positive event that meliorates the process of transition. Since we deal 
with capital movements, we also include KOF globalisation index (Glob) to account for 
globalization rigidities of recipient economies (e.g. Dreher, 2006). This index is aimed at 
capturing domestic environmental conditions and aspects related to capital mobility. (see 
Appendix for more details). The year variable (Year) is included due to the need to control for 
individual country effects and because our sample is in long form (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
Allowing for reverse causality or simultaneity, meaning FDI, ODA and domestic investment 
(DOM) are defined simultaneously, we estimate our model, using seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) technique. In this way we are better able to reveal the possible link between 
these investment flows. Thus, our empirical model is set up as follows:  
 
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
                      
                                                                                                (1) 
where  - countries (N=5) and  -time frame (T=18), FDI- foreign direct investment, ODA- official 
development assistance, ala- foreign aid, DOM- gross fixed capital formation in host country 
minus FDI since fixed capital portion of external flows, e.g. FDI is not financed by domestic 
residents, it should not be included in the domestic investment according to Younas (2011), Glob- 
is the KOF globalisation index. All the data for estimation were transformed into real per capita 
terms. The nominal series were deflated by the help of CPI.  
 
Given dimensions of our sample the estimation was implemented by employing SUR 
estimation technique proposed by Zellner (1962). This method allows us to jointly estimate three 
equations for our sample. Also, SUR estimator is based on small N=5 and large T=18 that is the 
feature of our sample
16
. SUR imposes each country to have its own coefficient vector unlike 
                                                          
16 Since our sample is in long panel format we technically cannot apply traditional fixed (FE) or random 
effects (FE) modelling or similar estimators such as instrumental variable (IV) generalized method of 
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pooled OLS or even fixed effect (FE) estimators (Baum 2006, p.238). Moreover, it allows cross-
section error component correlation, i.e. contemporaneous correlation. Estimator is efficient 
under the homoscedasticity condition which is managed by imposing bootstrapped standard 
errors. SUR estimation permits us to allow for the serial correlation over panels. Our estimates 
are equivalent to maximum likelihood (ML) estimates due to specification of iteration over 
disturbance covariance matrix and parameter estimates.     
 
The panel data advantage over cross section and time series is that we get bigger sample 
which increase degrees of freedom and reduce collinearity between variables. According to 
literature, using SUR would improve the efficiency of our estimates over the traditional pooled 
OLS (POLS) methods, where we cannot simultaneously estimate several equations. Hence, we 
prefer the SUR methodology. 
 
  
4.2 Data  
 
We construct a long form panel data where time dimension (T=18) exceeds the number of 
countries (N=5). All yearly aggregate variables are in real values
17
transformed into natural log to 
reduce variability and expressed in per capita terms to make feasible comparisons. We include a 
few explanatory variables because of our data dimensions; otherwise we will lose degrees of 
freedom. The data summary, correlation matrix, variables descriptions and sources are presented 
in Tables of the Appendix. 
 
Firstly, we chose these five countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, because they share similar economic, geographic and political setup. The remaining 
ten Former Soviet Union (FSU) Republics were different from the historical and geo-political 
view
18
. From 1991, all our five Republics broke away from the Soviet Union and established 
their sovereign states
19
.  Secondly, the so-called initial conditions principle appears if we were to 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
moments (GMM) that are based on large N and small T assumption regarding a sample. However, we 
could apply pooled estimators such as generalised least squares GLS, but it does not allow us simultaneity 
estimate our equations. (Baum, 2006, Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
 
17 We deflated monetary variables by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from IMF. 
 
18 Soviet Union had 15 Republics that after the break were all collectively called Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  The breakdown of countries by geographical markup is following: Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan); Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); 
Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine); Eurasia (Russia); Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia).  
 
19 Independence status officially declared: Kazakhstan (December 16, 1991); Kyrgyzstan (August 31, 
1991); Tajikistan (September 9, 1991); Turkmenistan (October 27, 1991) and Uzbekistan (September 1, 
1991). 
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look at the economic factors driving capital flows into this region (e.g. De Melo et al., 1997). Not 
all Soviet Union countries were the same before the break; Baltic, Transcaucasus and Eastern 
Europe countries had industrial bases, while Central Asian countries could be classified as 
agricultural and natural resources regions. Thirdly, the inclusion of only these five countries 
avoids the problem of sampling bias, for example, comparing countries with different levels of 
industrial setup that is very important in empirical investigation. Following our initial theoretical 
discussion and literature mentioned in earlier sections, we have constructed relevant variables for 
our model. Statistical reporting in home countries is not comprehensive and underdeveloped, so 
we use aggregate data from international organisations, such as United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is coherent 
with the objective of our ex-post study; to understand ODA-FDI link after 18 years of 
independence, 1992-2009
20
.  
 
 
5. Results  
 
The result of simultaneous estimation of equation # 1 on CA (5) regional level including all 
countries is presented in Table 2. Our regressors explain variability in FDI and ODA equations 
quite well that is inferred from R2, at 75% and 62% respectively. Both equations have high 
significance (see Chi2 and P-value). The same is true for DOM equation, R2=0.71%.  
 
The FDI equation (upper part, Table 2) displays a highly statistically significant the 
coefficient (+0.69) for ODA at 1% level. This means that a one unit increase in ODA raise FDI 
by 0.69 units. Since our model is in log-log form, all estimates, except globalization and year can 
be interpreted as elasticities. This means that one percent invested in foreign aid would induce 
inelastic 0.69% increase in FDI. At first sight the elasticity appears very low, but upon careful 
inspection of the institutional and social-economic situation this result is plausible. This suggests 
that donors are at least trying to contribute to investment climate through their humanitarian 
projects and activates in CA (5) economies.  
 
From the ODA equation (middle part, Table 2) we infer that 0.85 % increase in foreign aid is 
due to one percent increase in FDI – this is supported statistically. As one can easily observe, the 
same but reversed link, FDI-ODA, produces different and richer result that corroborates outcome 
from the first, FDI equation. Our elaboration on this result is that the ODA arrived earlier than 
FDI, because it was a support to assist countries at the beginning of transition in 1991. The FDI 
lagged behind due to uncertain political and economic situation in the first few years of 
independence. Hence, foreign aid assisted private investors, for example, via “information effect” 
that was mentioned before (e.g Mody et al., 2003). For that reason we started our analysis from 
1992 to give lead time for ODA to be absorbed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
20 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were included in the sample.  
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The common logic of donor aid is that the aid should stimulate self-sustainable development. 
In another words, donors expect from aid recipients that they will have their own initiatives and 
stimulate economic/social progress after the aid term has finished.  Agencies such as World 
Bank, IMF, ADB, UN, USAID and various embassies carry out their missions and have settled 
offices in CA(5). We assume that they have introduced foreign policies and served as a 
connection (or first-hand information) to private foreign investors (from their own countries) to 
learn about these countries, make contacts, find the right people, and ultimately invest. Private 
investors, who are public MNEs had to deal with hidden uncertainty/risks, especially, in 
transition economies of Central Asia. Our minor positive estimate of 0.85%, we believe, may also 
suggest that ODA helped them to place a private investment (FDI) and mitigate unsystematic 
(firm-related) risks up to a certain degree. This fact is illustrated in a study by Asiedu et al. 
(2009) where they demonstrate that foreign aid indeed reduces adverse effect of expropriation 
risk on FDI in Sub-Saharan developing economies. They found that foreign aid effect helped to 
mitigate host country governments’ rigidities. For example, any foreign investor could rely on her 
embassy in CA (5) to get a back-support and assistance as one of the legitimate channel in 
recipient countries.  
 
The positive sign of domestic investment (DOM) variable, +0.75%, in FDI equation (upper 
part, Table 2) also makes sense, because improvements in domestic infrastructure, coupled with 
abandoned natural resources, would attract private foreign investors assuming favourable socio-
political situation and market conditions. In our result domestic capital (DOM) drives increases in 
foreign direct investment. This could be explained by the following: transition economies are 
restricted in capital reserves and hence would be demanding more of external assistance, for 
example, FDI. We could not find positive effect of domestic investment (DOM) on foreign aid 
(ODA). Contrary, we found statistically significant negative estimate, -0.40%. One possible 
explanation is that at the early stages of economic development, transition countries of CA (5) 
were more concerned with economic growth and stabilization and less with social development. 
As the economic growth prospered countries’ current accounts’ have increased due to revenues 
from mineral endowments and exports, which brought increased foreign currency reserves as well 
as foreign debt. This process added to domestic savings which in turn allowed tangible 
investments in fixed capital directed into building infrastructure, plants, and facilities by local 
governments in later years. The statistical data on domestic spending from Table 1 supports this 
proposition. Hence, improvements in domestic spending had reduced the need for foreign aid.  
 
Now, domestic investment is complemented by FDI as shown by statistically significant positive 
sign at +1.06% (lower part, Table 2). Firstly, this confirms our result from FDI equation (see 
upper part, Table 2). This outcome is likely due to the priority FDI receives in fulfilling the 
immediate needs in infrastructure projects in CA (5) economies. Even though FDI is broadly 
considered as export-oriented in the region, which means that it is not oriented to serve local 
markets, it has rendered positive spillovers to recipient nations, as an increase in FDI inflows 
stimulated local economies to spend more on infrastructure. 
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Table 2. SUR Regional Regression. 
Dep.Var: FDI  FDI equation (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
ODA γ1 0.6931881    0.0995054      6.97    0.000      
DOM γ2 0.7480825    0.0802279      9.32    0.000      
GLOB γ3 0.0194746     0.022698      0.86    0.391     
YEAR γ4 0.1845425    0.0575444      3.21    0.001      
CONSTANT γ0 -374.0946      114.795     -3.26    0.001     
Dep.Var: ODA  ODA equation (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
FDI β1 0.8466694    0.1145693      7.39    0.000      
DOM β2 -0.3974756    0.1458185     -2.73    0.006     
GLOB β3 -0.0094726    0.0252811     -0.37    0.708     
YEAR β4 -0.2020223    0.0559339     -3.61    0.000     
CONSTANT β0  407.4895     111.6504       3.65     0.000      
Dep.Var: DOM  DOM equation (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
FDI δ1  1.060911    0.0969386      10.94     0.000      
ODA δ 2 -0.461506    0.1810261     -2.55    0.011     
GLOB δ 3 -0.0217236    0.0261163     -0.83    0.406     
YEAR δ 4 -0.1879391    0.0686111     -2.74    0.006     
CONSTANT δ 0  381.9386     136.7174       2.79    0.005      
FDI  
Equation: N                                   
 
75
ODA 
 Equation:  N 
 
75 
DOM 
Equation: N  
 
75 
R2  0.7504      R2  0.6159      R2  0.7144      
RMSE 1.349887     RMSE 1.407508     RMSE 1.521222     
Chi2  
P-value 
488.88       
0.0000 
Chi2 
P-value 
182.39 
      0.0000 
Chi2 
P-value 
308.42  
0.0000 
Note: All variables are in natural logarithms and in per capita terms. FDI- foreign direct investment, DOM-gross 
fixed capital formation, ODA- official development assistance, GLOB-is the KOF globalisation index.  N-number of 
observations, R2-goodness of model fit, B.SE-bootstrapped standard errors (under 400 replications). RMSE-room 
mean square error. Chi2/P-value- shows whether the model’s coefficients are statistically significant.  
This happens in the form of creating market access, improving transportation facilities and 
roads, enhancing taxation and amending financial regulation among others. Further, as we 
observe foreign aid (ODA) does seem to influence domestic investment negatively, -0.46%. It 
shows that more aid induces less domestic investment, e.g. financing it. We see the same 
substituting relationship from the ODA equation (middle part, Table 2) where highly statistically 
significant estimate is also negative, -0.40%. This result seems like a support for the opponents of 
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foreign aid idea who state that aid serves as extra financial source and consumed not contributing 
to economic development. Since we are not discussing the effect of aid on economic growth and 
national output we could only reflect on this result by going further on country level regressions 
in the next section. A reference source to learn about arguments against foreign aid is Easterly 
(2007).  For those who still believe in aid professor Gustav Ranis presents  his view in support of 
this idea. (Ranis, 2011).  
 
In sum, since FDI and ODA complement each other on regional level according to our 
findings we conclude that there an indication on viable positive link between aggregate foreign 
aid and private flows. What is more important here is that these flows are not competing (or 
substituting) flows: we comprehend it as FDI improves industrial and foreign aid helps human 
capital development. The role of private investment seems to be pro-growth since it induces more 
domestic spending according to our estimates.   
 
5.1 Country Regressions  
 
To gain better understanding and test our findings on regional level we run equation # 1 
simultaneously for each separate country and present results in Table 3 below. Outcomes are very 
interesting, because they show differentiated picture. We begin looking at FDI equation 
framework and later on at ODA and DOM one.  
Only two countries namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan display statistically significant 
effects of foreign aid on FDI. More, we observe positive (driving in) effect for Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan with substantial magnitude in Kyrgyzstan of +5.21% which means that 1% dollar of 
aid attracts 5.21% of FDI. In another words, foreign aid complements FDI in these countries. 
From social point of view this result could be associated with changes in political sector and 
social reforms in Kyrgyzstan that went through three revolutions and particular focus of DAC 
donors on Tajikistan which is considered the “poorest” among CA (5) economies. (see GDP 
value in Table 1). Further, both countries are favorable destinations of donors that are confirmed 
by sample ODA statistics. These nations are a step ahead in governance and reforms compared to 
neighbors in CA (5). Also, we assume that investors were lured by on-going institutional changes 
and new market opportunities. One may think that it is especially for that reason we see this 
complementing effect. The same crowding in effect of ODA is observed in Tajikistan, though 
only of +1.69% elastic magnitude. The lesser but still positive effect compared to Kyrgyzstan 
could be due to similar institutional improvements. However, from economic point of view we 
believe that observed link in these nations is due to low national output levels and economic 
growth. The latter claim comes from the fact that our globalization variable (Glob) is not 
significant. We should have observed significant relationship in Kazakhstan but don’t that is 
considered the hub of donor’s network and their institutions in Central Asia.     
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Table 3. SUR Country Regressions. 
 
COUNTRY:  KAZ     KYR TAJ TKM UZB 
DEP.VAR/  FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
ODA δ1 0.095      
[0.649]      
5.207***   
[0.967]     
1.686*   
[0.782]     
1.201  
  [0.804]     
-0.636  
  [0.696]      
DOM δ 2 0.576
*      
[0.308]      
-1.625**   
[0.663]      
-0.131   
[0.525]      
-0.405    
[1.612]      
1.356*  
  [0.523]      
GLOB δ 3 -0.007      
[0.141]     
-0.181     
[0.122]     
0.078    
[0.285]      
-0.347  
  [0.386]     
-0.226     
[0.392]      
YEAR δ 4 0.043     
[0.245]      
0.719***   
[0.163]      
0.179 
   [0.304]     
0.283  
   [0.335]      
0.359 
   [0.356]     
CONSTANT δ 0 -85.131   
[482.017]     
-1439.02***   
[321.104]     
-363.398   
[600.759]      
-550.709     
[659.95]     
-719.93   
[697.618]      
N  17 15 16 11 16 
R2  0.875      0.780      0.9496 0.979 0.969 
RMSE  0.482     0.586     0.588     0.405     0.332     
Chi2 
P-value 
 131.71   
  0.000 
114.58  
  0.0000 
315.65    
0.000 
538.41    
0.000 
574.83 
   0.000 
COUNTRY:  KAZ     KYR TAJ TKM UZB 
DEP.VAR/  ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA 
FDI β1 0.058        
[0.428]      
0.186***   
[0.034]      
0.296**   
[0.118]      
0.592  
  [0.381]      
-0.672  
  [0.513]     
DOM β2 0.456  
   [0.348]      
0.323***   
[0.113]      
0.383***   
[0.112]      
0.609    
 [0.841]      
1.483* 
   [0.694]      
GLOB β3 0.178  
   [0.126]      
0.035  
    [0.027]      
-0.072      
[0.113]     
0.372      
[0.399]      
0.086   
  [0.305]     
YEAR β4 -0.344     
[0.211]     
-0.138***   
[0.030]     
-0.002   
[0.126]      
-0.313    
[0.204]     
0.008   
   [0.321]      
CONSTANT βo 677.377    
[413.718]      
276.205***   
[59.284]      
5.553   
[250.095]     
609.558  
[403.547]      
-28.875   
[633.988]     
N  17 15 16 11 16 
R2  0.899 0.971      0.989 0.989 0.975 
RMSE  0.378     0.112     0.251     0.292     0.342     
Chi2 
P-value 
 164.07  
  0.000 
700.33  
  0.0000 
1499.83     
0.000 
1232.41  
  0.000 
726.46      
0.000 
COUNTRY:  KAZ     KYR TAJ TKM UZB 
DEP.VAR/  DOM DOM DOM DOM DOM 
FDI δ1 0.793
*       
[0.466]      
-0.536***   
[0.200]     
-0.096      
[0.606]     
-0.362   
[144.53]     
0.571***   
[0.142]      
ODA δ2 1.023     
[0.832]      
2.977***   
[0.844]      
1.600*  
  [0.873]      
1.104  
  [121.14]      
0.591 
   [0.398]      
GLOB δ3 -0.192
*      
[0.118]     
-0.105    
[0.073]     
0.147   
 [0.199]      
-0.507  
  [18.09]     
0.038   
  [0.189]      
YEAR δ4 0.345
*     
[0.204]      
0.411***   
[0.116]      
-0.131     
[0.212]     
0.438 
   [0.584]      
-0.116  
 [0.197]     
CONSTANT δ0 -678.139
*    
[401.979]     
-822.962***   
[230.793]     
257.660   
[419.033]      
-852.846   
[640.971]     
236.818  
[387.984]      
N  17 15 16 11 16 
R2  0.930 0.796 0.978 0.978 0.992     
RMSE  0.579     0.337     0.504     0.382         0.224     
Chi2 
P-value 
 272.28    
0.000 
113.81  
  0.0000 
727.56      
0.000 
534.01 
0.000 
2559.90  
  0.000 
Note: 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. KAZ-Kazakhstan, KYR-Kyrgyzstan, TAJ-Tajikistan, TKM-Turkmenistan 
and UZB-Uzbekistan. Bootstrapped (under 400 replications) standard errors in square brackets.  The variable 
descriptions the same as in note for Table 2. 
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We obtained striking result on the ODA equation from Table 3, middle block. Here, only 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan report moderate inelastic, but highly statistically significant estimates. 
Again, we see complementing effect of FDI in Kyrgyzstan by +0.19 % increase in ODA and for 
Tajikistan FDI’s attracting effect is of + 0.30 %. These results confirm the first FDI equation 
(Table 3, first block) outcomes and we could conclude that there is indeed some indication of 
positive complementing correlation between ODA and FDI in these nations. The rest of countries 
display no connection of FDI to foreign aid.  
As for relation of these foreign flows to domestic investment (Table 3, last block) we 
could observe that FDI is of high importance in three countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. However, we obtain substituting effect in Kyrgyzstan (-0.54%) and complementing 
ones in Kazakhstan (+0.79%) and Uzbekistan (+0.57%). This could mean that FDI finances 
domestic investment in Kyrgyzstan, in other words, local economy enjoys the rent as foreign 
private capital renders saving on domestic expenditures. On opposite, the complementing effect 
in the latter two countries display that FDI induces more spending, augmenting domestic 
investment.  On the other hand, relation of ODA to domestic spending is important only in 
Kyrgyzstan (+2.98%) and Tajikistan (+1.60%) from our estimates. In both countries foreign aid 
attracts more funding from local authorities on domestic needs. This is positive and favorable 
from the objective of foreign aid that is aimed at long term sustainability in recipient country. In 
other words, as a first-order effect foreign aid paves the road to private foreign investors in these 
two countries and as a second-order effect it induces more domestic investment. Ideally, this 
process in its turn contributes to economic growth, bringing along market reforms and trade 
facilitation. However, we don’t observe a tangible increase in national output in these nations.  
We could try to give some support for our findings in previous paragraph. We found 
important results only for two countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that are consistently reporting 
significant estimates from all three equations. We attribute this finding to additional following 
facts about these two countries. Firstly, these nations received sizable total foreign aid 1992-
2009: Kyrgyzstan (23.8$-315$) while Tajikistan (11.9$-409$) millions much higher than the rest. 
Secondly, for the period of 2007/2008 the Kyrgyzstan was on the third place among the top ten 
nations from 181 world economies in pro-markets reforms. (“Doing Business 2009” Report 
IBRD/World Bank, 2008). This report especially tracks local government’s actions in improving 
business environment. This gives us grounds to believe in viable link between foreign aid and 
foreign direct investment in this economy. Also, “Investing Across Borders-2010” report by 
World Bank Group places Kyrgyzstan on the first place among Central Asian economies in terms 
of domestic foreign ownership participation rate. From official document “Tajikistan’s Quest for 
Growth: Stimulating Private Investment” Tajikistan’s Quest for Growth: Stimulating Private 
Investment (World Bank, 2011) we could infer that Tajikistan’s government placed a tangible 
actions for enhancing investment climate. To summarize, there may be other sources to support 
above notions. Our rationale from empirical estimation tend us to believe that positive 
“stimulating” effect between foreign aid and private capital is observed solely due to 
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impoverished economic conditions, low national output  and domestic spending in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper attempts to tackle the currently debated issue on the link between foreign aid and 
foreign direct investment in five Central Asian economies for the period 1992-2009. Differently 
from previous contributions we applied seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique to test 
the above conjecture.  
 
One of the principal conclusions of this paper is that, on a regional level, aggregate foreign 
aid has a complementing effect on foreign direct investment in five Central Asian economies. The 
reverse effect is also present, so we accept the finding as a positive association or link between 
ODA and FDI in the region. Our finding is supported by findings of Harms and Lutz (2006), 
especially, in rigid institutional environments that are present in Central Asian economies.  
 
Another important observation is that aggregate foreign direct investment inflows positively 
induce more of domestic investment. This is very important since as its well known that domestic 
investment increase the size of the capital stock, and therefore helps determine the long-run 
growth. Thus, we believe that foreign aid raises the local complimentary inputs quality such as 
education and health, while foreign direct investments brings advanced technology, and possibly 
shifts the production frontier upward and ultimately contributes to a raise in efficiency and 
productivity. Regarding foreign direct investment, this also implies that domestic firms are 
learning to better combine external technology with domestic inputs in production process.  
 
However, the direct link between foreign aid and private investment on aggregate country 
level is found only in two countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan even though these nations have 
received less of foreign capital but more of aid on average for the period. We attribute this result 
as follows: foreign aid works in countries with low national incomes given sufficient foreign aid 
inflows, especially, in the early transition period.     
 
If our finding on the interaction of donor aid on foreign private investment flows nexus is 
true, then international humanitarian organisations indeed could boost positive pro-growth 
changes in domestic economies in collaboration with multinational enterprises (MNEs). This 
means better understanding the role and value of donor aid could substantially reduce aid 
outflows, and increase its efficiency via a sort of public-private partnership. MNEs are most 
likely to be more collaborative with international donors operating in Central Asia and other 
developing economies around the world. 
 
The future works could juxtapose our model and results on different transition individual 
economies and try to refute or corroborate the results found in this paper. We remain to think that 
capital flow studies reveal better results when approached from individual country level.  
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Appendices 
Table A1. Data Sources and Descriptions. 
Variable  Name Description Source 
FDI  FDI The Foreign Direct Investment. The value of capital of 
MNEs in host country in real terms.  US Dollars at 
current prices in millions. 
UNCTAD 
Official 
Development 
Assistance  
ODA Net official Development Assistance received and aid 
received, US Dollars at current prices in millions. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI online) 
Domestic 
Investment 
DOM Gross Fixed Capital Formation minus FDI inflows. This 
way we can obtain local investments by government and 
private sector into fixed assets and human capital less 
payments for foreign debt. US Dollars at current prices in 
millions.  
UNCTAD 
Globalization 
Index 
GLOB KOF Globalization Index. Measures macroeconomic 
environment.  
KOF 
Pop Pop Population UNCTAD 
CPI CPI Consumer Price Index IMF 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics Summary: Total Sample. Real Values.  
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev.        Min   Max 
FDI Millions USD 90 8560.768     40540.69         -24    329166.7 
ODA Millions USD 90 13016.4     91989.88    5.884357      861000 
DOM Millions USD 90 1206949 9386283 20.38859    8.84e+07 
Glob 0-100 85 38.42625     11.10762    15.14242    59.74965 
Pop Millions USD 90 11.13199     7.945662    3.881973    27.12806 
CPI Percent
 
90 2.759488     3.828602    1.00e-05    19.14858 
Year Years 90   1992 2009 
 
 
Table A3. Correlation Matrix.  
 FDI ODA DOM GLOB Year 
FDI 1.0000     
ODA 0.1282    1.0000    
DOM 0.0671    0.9843*   1.0000   
GLOB -0.1701   -0.1784   -0.1435    1.0000  
Year  -0.2872* -0.2274* -0.2090*   0.5478*   1.0000 
 
Note: variable are in real terms. Significant correlations at 5% significance level are marked by *.  
20 
 
A4. Variables of the Model 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - this is an aggregate per capita real value in current million of US 
dollars converted into real values dividing by Consumer Price Index (CPI) index. The reason for choosing 
flow and not stock value is because we seek to capture the link between FDI-ODA and we cannot do so in 
the case where FDI is stock, which means it is a part of domestic capital.  
Official Development Assistance (ODA) - taken from UNCTAD database and in aggregate form. It 
includes what is actually received (and not disbursed meaning it was allocated, but not yet transferred to 
recipient county) as official development assistance and aid made by DAC donor countries. We use yearly 
aggregate data in this study. Variable was deflated by CPI and expressed in natural logarithmic form per 
capita.  
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Capital) - this variable is the domestic investment of the government 
into fixed assets such as plants, buildings, roads and infrastructure. Variable was deflated by CPI and 
expressed in natural logarithmic form per capita. Note that this variable is also in flow form and it is not a 
net value (after depreciation). It is investment to domestic capital stock.   
  
Independent Variable: Environmental  
 
KOF Globalization Index- this index is composed of three components and defined as: (a) economic 
globalization - featured as long distance flows of goods, capital and services and market exchange 
attributes such as information and perceptions; (b) political globalization - depicted by a diffusion of 
government policies; and (c) social globalization - expressed as the dissemination of ideas, information, 
images and people. 
Source: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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